Consumers are increasingly demanding products that closely match their individual preferences, and advances in manufacturing and information technologies have made it possible to satisfy this demand. This can be done in two ways. Under the traditional approach, firms can produce a larger number of product variants, and the greater selection enables consumers to find products that are closer to their ideal choice. An alternative approach is based on mass customization (Pine 1993), whereby firms individually customize products to each customer's specifications. In this paper, we study the determinants of product variety for a traditional firm that follows the first approach; compare it to a customizing firm; derive the optimal decisions of a dual-channel firm that operates both a traditional and a customizing channel; and study the results of competition between the two types of firms.
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There is a rich and diverse literature on product variety which cannot be fully surveyed here due to lack of space (cf. Ho and Tang 1998) . Chen et al. (1998 ), De Groote (1994 and Gaur and Honhon (2004) , consider a traditional firm's optimal product-line, that is, its optimal product positions and prices. Dewan et al. (2003) , Jiang et al. (2004) , Alptekinoḡlu and Corbett (2004) and Mendelson and Parlaktürk (2004) consider product-line design when firms can customize their products. Past work on customization focused on the firm's product design and pricing decisions without considering the roles of inventory fulfillment and delay, which are key operational features of the problem. In this paper, we explicitly model these aspects, incorporating the stocking of standard products and the make-to-order nature of customized products (and the associated delay), in addition to product design and pricing decisions.
Model
Our model considers a market with products that differ in their attributes and customers who differ in their preferences for these product attributes. We model the product space Θ = [0, 1] using a Hotelling line, whereby each product ζ i ∈ Θ is characterized by its location on the unit line segment. We consider two types of firms, traditional and mass customizing.
Traditional Firm: The traditional firm offers only standard products. It decides how many products to offer n, their configurations specified by ζ 1 , ζ 2 , ..., ζ n , and prices specified by p 1 , p 2 , ..., p n . The firm incurs a fixed product overhead cost K per product variant per unit time. Once the firm determines its product offers, it stocks each variant, which it sells from stock. Inventory is managed separately for each variant. The firm replenishes its stocks at a fixed cost S per order at unit cost c s . Replenishment is instantaneous, that is, there is no leadtime (the paper also considers the effects of replenishment leadtimes). For each unit kept in stock, the firm incurs inventory holding cost h per unit time. The firm applies a continuous inventory review and it follows a base stock policy ordering up to some optimal Q i when its inventory position in variant i falls to zero. 1 We use the term fulfilment cost to refer to the sum of the inventory holding costs and the fixed order costs of the traditional firm.
When a type-θ customer buys a type-ζ standard product, her utility is equal to
The reservation price w s ∈ R + is the customer's willingness to pay for her preferred product configuration. 2 The customer's utility then decreases by p, the unit price of the product and by the disutility of the sacrifice relative to her preferred configuration r|ζ − θ| α , where r ∈ R + is the intensity of customer preference and α ∈ R + measures the significance of the degree of misfit.
Mass customizing firm: A mass customizing firm, or customizing firm in short, customizes its product to each configuration θ while pricing the customized product at p(θ). The firm customizes-toorder at rate µ, which measures of the ease (speed) of customization. It does not carry inventory and has a unit cost c c . 3 When the customizing firm receives orders at rate λ c , customers incur an average delay cost W µ (λ c ) (for notational simplicity, we suppress µ when writing W ), and their total expected delay cost is L(λ c ) = λ c W (λ c ) per unit of time. So, when a type-θ customer buys a customized product, her utility is equal to
Customer Choice: Customers arrive according to a renewal process with rate, or demand intensity, λ, and they differ in their ideal attributes, or preferred configurations, which are uniformly distributed on Θ, independent of the arrival process. When a customer arrives to the market, she observes the product offers (standard and customized). If buying a product yields positive utility, the customer purchases one unit of the product that gives her the highest utility. The arrival sequence of customers who buy customized products form a renewal process with rate λ c , which is also referred to as the effective demand rate for customized products. Similarly, we call λ i the effective demand rate for standard product variant i.
Analysis
We first consider how a traditional monopolist maximizes the profit margin of a single standard product variant; this analysis is useful for describing the firms' optimal policies. For a given product variant, a price discount γ relative to the reservation price (i.e., p i = w s − γ) results in market coverage 2(γ/r) 1/α which yields the profit margin
where the fourth term is the unit fulfillment cost and the last term is the unit overhead cost. Let Γ maximize (1) for γ, and
which is equal to Γ when K = 0. Then, the firm's minimum unit loss due to customer misfit, fulfilment and product overhead costs is
Here, we focus on the market equilibrium in duopoly of a traditional and a customizing firm (we do not describe some technical assumptions which guarantee that both firms coexist and all customers are served). 4 The traditional firm chooses its number of product variants n, their locations ζ ∈ Θ n and their prices p ∈ R n + . Upon observing the traditional firm's products and prices, the customizing firm sets a price menu p c (θ) for each product configuration θ ∈ Θ. 5 Let m j = w j − c j , j = s, c, denote the firms' maximum profit margins and Π j , j = s, c, denote their profits.
Proposition 1 When traditional Firm s competes with customizing Firm c, it positions its products
symmetrically at ζ i = (2i − 1)/(2n) and sets equal prices p i = p s for i = 1, 2, ..., n. The equilibrium 4 The paper also studies a traditional and a customizing single-channel monopoly as well as a dual-channel monopoly (selling both customized and standard products).
5 That is, the firm that sets a menu of prices follows the firm that sets a uniform price as in Thisse and Vives (1988) . Simultaneous moves in pricing would not yield an equilibrium with undominated strategies.
is further characterized by the following equations.
In the extended abstract, we do not formally state the customizing firm's pricing policy for brevity.
The customizing firm sets the maximum price that leaves its each customer indifferent to buying her best standard product alternative.
Discussion of the Results
In this section, we discuss the managerial implications of our results, first addressing their implications for traditional operations and then considering the factors that affect the profitability of mass customization.
Traditional Operations: Competing on Product Variety. Our results show how the traditional firm competes on product variety. First, it determines the efficient scale of each product variant so as to maximize its operating margin. In particular, the efficient scale balances the lower fulfillment and product overhead costs that result from a larger scale against the higher costs of customer misfit (and the associated effect on price). The efficient scale is independent of the competition and is the same for a single-and multi-channel monopoly.
Competitive considerations, or the availability of another channel, determine the market share the firm allocates to its traditional variants (which is clearly 100% for a single-channel monopoly).
The firm's traditional product line consists of the number of variants needed to obtain that market share, where each variant is produced at its efficient scale. In duopoly competition, rather than increase its product variety to lessen the customization advantage of its opponent, the firm chooses to reduce the number of variants it sells to ease the competition. In particular, a traditional firm in duopoly competition offers fever product variants compared to a dual-channel monopoly, which also offers fever variants compared to a single-channel traditional monopoly.
We next find that the relative returns from reducing c s , h, S or K are equal to their relative effects on the full unit cost g(Γ) + c s , which are independent of the competition: They are the same for a single and dual-channel monopoly, as well as a duopoly. This is a result of the variety-based strategy discussed above: The firm optimizes its operational tradeoffs on a variant-by-variant basis, whereas competition drives the number of variants (as well as the price of its product line).
Conditions Favoring Mass Customization: Our results provide systematic guidelines that can help a firm determine whether mass customization is likely to be profitable. We first consider the effect of the market size λ. The results for the traditional firm are straightforward: It always benefits from an increase in market size due to economies of scale in its operations. However, the effect of market size on the customizing firm is more intricate. In particular, the customizing firm's profit declines in λ when dλc dλ < 0. 6 Furthermore, its effective demand rate λ c is quasiconvex in λ. It follows that a larger market size does not monotonically increase the profit of the customizing firm. We find that customization is well-suited either to a small enough market, where the traditional opponent cannot compete due to high unit fulfillment and product overhead costs, or to a sufficiently large market, where the competition is mild. In between, a larger market hurts the customizing firm because of the increased competition. We also find that the sign of dλ c /dλ is non-decreasing in m c − m s . In other words, the traditional firm reacts less aggressively to an increase in market size when m c − m s is larger. So, a customizing firm with a higher production cost or a lower quality will be better off in smaller markets. In summary, there should be a fit between the firm's product line and its market environment, namely market size and the firm's quality and cost vis-a-vis its competitor.
Other factors that affect the attractiveness of mass customization include the intensity of customer preferences r and the shape of the customer misfit function, determined by α. It is straightforward to show that the customizing firm's profit increases, and in contrast the traditional firm's profit decreases, in r. Numerical results also show that a more concave misfit cost (a smaller α) increases the customizing firm's profit while decreasing the traditional firm's profit.
Another important parameter that affects the adoption of mass customization is the expected time it takes to customize each unit of the product 1/µ, which is a measure of the difficulty or complexity of customization. Intuition suggests customization should be more attractive when it's easier (hence faster). While this always holds for a monopoly, a larger µ may actually hurt the customizing firm in a duopoly. As might be expected, the traditional firm always suffers from a decrease in its competitor's customization time. However, a shorter customization is also detrimental to the customizing firm when it does not have a strong initial market position. In this case, the traditional competitor responds aggressively by increasing its product variety, whereas 6 Even when dλ c dλ > 0, its profit need not increase in λ due to the increased product variety of its traditional competitor.
when the customizing firm has a strong initial position, the traditional competitor responds by reducing its product variety and concedes more of the market to the customizing firm. Overall, we find that the customizing firm is more likely to benefit from faster customization when its relative cost and quality compared to the traditional competitor are more favorable (either due to lower m s or higher m c , h, S, and K). Specifically, we show that the customizing firm benefits from faster customization only beyond a critical threshold which decreases in its relative cost advantage m c − m s + g(Γ).
